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by Danny Quah
C
reative people produce
ideas. Let us call them
intellectual assets. New
knowledge, building layer
upon layer on itself, has
been the basis of the phenomenal
change for the better in the human
condition in the last 200 years,
transforming the economically dismal
world of the previous 12,000 years.
Kenneth Arrow, the Stanford
University economist and 1972
economics Nobel laureate, liked to
use the conundrum that hypothetical
financial supporters of 17th-century
scientific research might have
confronted if faced by two grant
applications: the first, proposing to
study the properties of different woods
and metals in constructing the hulls of
ocean-going ships; the second,
proposing to analyse the properties 
of the square root of -1. The first
offered immediate benefits to society.
But the second? 
How could anyone have foreseen that
the square root of -1 (which Descartes
referred to in a derogatory way as an
imaginary number) would make
intuitive the formulas in Einstein’s
theories of special and general
relativity; would become an integral
part of quantum mechanics; would
enter Maxwell’s theory of
electromagnetism and thus be used by
every electrical engineer, radar
operator, signals analyst and
telecommunications specialist in the
coming four hundred years; and would
be embedded in every electrical
gadget, personal computer, Internet
device, or mobile telephone that we
use today? 
Two features are central to this story.
The first is the way in which economic
growth draws at its most fundamental
level from interaction with knowledge
and ideas. The second, (described by
Douglass North, the economic
historian and 1993 Nobel laureate) is
the intermediating system by which
societies have figured out ways to
reward innovators and agents of
creativity by giving them property
rights in ideas.
The story goes like this. Strong
property rights legally identify an
owner, including the owners of ideas.
They transform mere assets into
property specific to particular
individuals. In doing this, those
property rights sharpen the incentive
to develop and put to productive use
the resources owned. Society gains
as well through the provision of
worthwhile goods and services.
This is an extremely orthodox,
neoclassical economic story of the
kind that we teach to students in
universities worldwide. Strong property
rights and voluntary exchange, through
markets or otherwise, lead to socially
optimal outcomes. Such arrangements,
almost magically, align the self-serving
behaviour of individual property 
owners with the good of society at
large. This proposition is not just a
creed of conservative apologists 
for the capitalist system. It is an 
insight that serves well for a simple
reason: it works.
Since economically worthwhile ideas
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) are supposed to be a system to
reward creative thinkers. But Danny Quah finds that all too often they
fail both in theory and in practice. Here he explores other possibilities,
particularly in relation to computers and software.
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are productive assets, the seductive
and easy parallel conclusion is that
intellectual property rights (IPRs)
should lead similarly to good social
outcomes. Michael Eisner of Disney
Corporation and Jack Valenti of the
Motion Picture Association of America
have indeed argued that strong
intellectual property rights are
absolutely fundamental to the efficient
workings of economies.
This conclusion, unfortunately, 
is wrong. 
To understand why, we need to dig a
little bit into the nature of ideas and
knowledge. Ideas are nonrival and
infinitely expansible. Their use by
someone does not detract from the
usefulness in their nature to yet others.
Trading ideas is not an exchange
where ideas are handed over for
something else; instead, trading ideas
simply creates copies of the idea,
each exact copy of the idea as much
of an original as the original idea itself.
In these characteristics, ideas have an
intrinsic nature to them that
distinguishes them from all other
ordinary economic commodities. 
Ordinary commodities are rival. Once
someone has eaten an apple, that
apple not only cannot satisfy anyone
else’s hunger; the apple is physically
no more. Ordinary commodities do not
carry infinite expansibility. Apples
exchange for, say, oranges by being
physically handed over. One party to
the trade goes home bereft of apples
but with pockets full of oranges.
Apples do not reproduce freely and
instantaneously on demand. 
The upshot is that trade in ideas
differs from trade in most other things
economically valuable. The
neoclassical reasoning on why
voluntary exchange succeeds in
delivering so much good to so many
breaks down for ideas. When an idea-
owner sells the good, he continues to
have it. Both buyer and seller and all
others in similar situations will see
incentive to keep selling (and in the
process making) copies of the idea as
long as that idea’s market price
remains positive, given that the
opportunity cost to them of providing
further copies of the idea is zero, for
they continue to retain the idea to use
or consume however they wish. The
process ends only when the market is
completely saturated. But a forward-
looking, purposeful idea-maker – the
creative knowledge-worker, the
putative newly entitled intellectual
asset owner – will realise this dynamic
is in place long before the total
saturation point is reached. He will
move on to do something more
financially rewarding (perhaps
becoming a plumber in north London).
Societies can put in place some
friction to that free competitive
exchange and dissemination of ideas.
Useful ideas could be kept as trade
secrets, divulged only to specific
individuals or to particular industry
groups, forming trusted coalitions.
Ideas could be handed over only with
tight restrictions on what can be done
with them. Laws could be set up that
do no more than disallow competition
between alternative idea-producers.
Technologies might be built that slow
down the transmission of ideas.
Whatever it turns out to be, these
arrangements work by disrupting
markets. Through curtailing the
distribution and dissemination of
ideas, such arrangements raise the
exchange price of ideas and thus
incentivise creativity. 
Intellectual property rights are one
such disruption in markets. They are
not ordinary property rights but they
prevent perfectly competitive
dissemination of ideas, so that ideas
end up under-used in the world.
Intellectual property rights restrict how
ideas can be built on, sequentially
refined and iteratively improved. They
prevent development of socially
desirable, closely competing ideas.
They encourage applying creativity
and ingenuity to circumvent their
strictures through finding legal
loopholes, but without improving the
lot of humanity by pushing outwards
the frontier of technology. They create
monopolies in the market for ideas.
But IPRs are also, if not a strictly
necessary evil, for now at least an evil
that gets the job done of incentivising
knowledge-creation. 
The world would be a dire place were
no new ideas being constantly
created. But at the same time having
so much of the creative output of
humanity cordoned off cannot be a
good thing either. Let us call this the
essential, inherent tension in
intellectual assets and let us reserve
the term “intellectual property” for
when the artificial construct of
property rights are asserted over such
assets. 
This inherent tension, in one form or
another, has been long recognised,
even if not always openly
acknowledged in contemporary policy
debate. William Nordhaus analysed it
in his economics PhD dissertation at
Yale in the late 1960s. Two centuries
before that, Thomas Jefferson, one of
the drafters of the US Constitution,
wrote powerfully on the nature of
ideas, articulating the concepts of
nonrivalry and infinite expansibility.
While he founded the US Patent
Office and provided in the US
Constitution a clause that protects
intellectual property, he considered
the monopolies thus created a
national embarrassment. (This
particular founding father of the
United States of America never
thought it unAmerican to dispute the
status of intellectual property.) 
Remember this delicate trade-off:
society-wide curtailment and
underemployment of ideas
(Jefferson’s national embarrassment)
set against the potential good that
incentivising creativity ought to
deliver. But is this trade-off for real?
Does current IPR practice succeed at
the second task of incentivising and
rewarding? Some propositions in
economic theory fail to hold in 
reality. Some empirical regularities
from the real world pose puzzles for
economic theory. But the current
formal systems of intellectual property
might have the singular distinction of
failing not just in theory but in
practice as well. 
Ideas are nonrival and infinitely expansible
There is this powerful conceit of the
lone inventor, puttering about in the
garage or in the woodshed at the
bottom of the garden, coming up with
world-beating inventions at the
weekend, but ending up with no
financial gain. Without a social
infrastructure of protection, these
amateurs without business savvy are
ripped off by some ruthless
multinational corporation. (Even with
IPR slapped around an idea, because
patent infringement is a civil not a
criminal offence, a patent-holder still
has to take an offender to court,
involving costly litigation way beyond
the means of most people.)
Even when they work properly in
theory, intellectual property rights
confound the workings of markets and
thus potentially inflict social damage.
In practice, they sometimes do not
even achieve their supposed good of
rewarding the deserving and thus
incentivising the creative originators of
ideas. Indeed sometimes they
perversely reward the undeserving.
At the turn of the 20th century,
Thomas Edison built an empire around
his creative output of inventions – the
light bulb, electricity provision by
networks, the phonograph, the
modern dynamo and hundreds of
others. Edison founded a company
that went on to become the world’s
largest and most successful
corporation. He accumulated personal
wealth that placed him within the top
400 of the US’s richest individuals. 
By contrast, Nicholas Tesla, Edison’s
contemporary and great rival who held
over 700 patents on radio, florescent
light, the alternating current motor,
wireless communication and much
else, died miserably poor, spending
his last years feeding pigeons outside
New York’s Public Library. Yet it was
Tesla’s AC motor that allowed viable
electricity transmission over Edison’s
networks, when Edison wrongly
persisted in wishing to retain DC
technology. In the event, Tesla’s
critical idea prevailed but went
unrewarded, while Edison’s wrong-
headed one garnered the financial
rewards. Public relations and
entrepreneurial savvy trumped the raw
intellectual idea. 
This negative message echoes in
example after example: Gary Kildall’s
operating system for personal
computers, CP/M, developed a
decade before Bill Gates’s deal with
IBM, did not give Kildall even a tiny
fraction of Gates’s hundred billion
dollar wealth or save him from death in
a barroom brawl with some bikers (as
one colourful legend has it). Eli
Whitney’s 1792 patent on the cotton
gin won him no part of the US’s 900-
fold increase in cotton exports over
the ensuing 70 years (by which time
cotton accounted for half the value of
total US exports to the rest of the
world). Xerox Corporation held
patents on the laser printer, Ethernet,
graphical-interface computer operating
systems using multiple windows,
mouse and keyboard, and WSYWIG
word processing. These concepts
were successfully exploited by
everyone else, but not by Xerox
Corporation itself. 
Just as intellectual property rights have
not always protected an innovator, nor
does their strengthening necessarily
generate greater innovation. The
dramatic increase in strong intellectual
property rights awarded in the US
since 1975 reflects, in part, court
decisions extending patent protection
for software. However, this
strengthening and extension of IP
coverage did not obviously elicit
greater innovation effort in the industry.
Between 1987 and 1994 real R&D
spending in the computer and
software industry fell 20%, while the
number of patents awarded increased
200% and real R&D spending in
corporate America overall rose 25%. 
What have we learnt from this
experience? In theory, property rights
on ideas inflict losses in social
efficiency; humanity ends up under
using ideas. Again, in theory, societies
tolerate this because those property
rights are needed to reward and
incentivise the creators of ideas. In
practice, however, we have just seen
many cases where intellectual
property rights don’t do this last bit
well at all, either through not providing
enough reward to the right people or
through providing too much to the
wrong ones. In all those situations and
many others like them, society has
simply sacrificed economic value to no
good purpose whatsoever. Our loss
from current arrangements for
managing intellectual assets is double.
But societies and economies are
surprisingly adaptive organisms. When
an itch manifests itself, a mechanism
for scratching that itch eventually
appears as well, without necessarily
anyone consciously designing that
scratcher. The process, however, can
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be slow and there is nothing to stop
us trying to speed things up. 
Mechanisms that can circumvent the
economic difficulties that ideas,
creativity and knowledge introduce
can be divided into two kinds:
conscious intervention and hands-off
(spontaneously emergent) social
behavior. 
The economic historian Paul David
has noted how institutions such as
patronage and procurement can
provide substitute incentive
mechanisms in place of intellectual
property rights. Both of these are
found in the real world – Research
Council support for academic
research, military or space exploration
contracts and wealthy patron support
for the arts are some prominent
examples. These distance the
incentive for creating an idea from the
individual rewards arising in its
dissemination.
Yet other suggested schemes work
similarly, by separating dissemination
reward from initiation incentive. Jenny
Lanjouw, a former PhD student at the
LSE, has proposed global market
segmentation in intellectual property
rights for pharmaceuticals that could
potentially benefit the poor and
disease-afflicted in the Third World,
without disincentivising
pharmaceutical innovation in the
West. Michael Kremer at Harvard has
suggested that patents be auctioned
off generally, but with governments
randomly buying some of the
intellectual assets for release into 
the public domain, thereby freeing
those intellectual assets into socially
efficient usage. 
Finally, perhaps an even crazier
suggestion: divert what government
and legal resources societies
currently expend on determining and
protecting intellectual property rights
– patents, copyright, trademarks –
into building instead mechanisms for
providing an appropriate and reliable
flow of intellectual services derived
from the underlying intellectual assets.
Unlike the intellectual assets
themselves, such services would be
rival and finite and would show none
of the market failures described
above. Since we already have a
Financial Services Authority, we might
also have a parallel Intellectual
Services Authority!
Interestingly, the computer software
industry, so active in the intellectual
land grab, is also the one that has
seen greatest innovation in
institutional mechanisms. Open
Source Software is the most notable
such example. The term describes
software that is provided with the
underlying code available for others to
refine, develop and learn from.
SourceForge.net, the largest
repository of Open Source code and
applications, hosts over 71,000
software projects, all freely available
for downloading over the Internet.
Some of these are, admittedly, of
interest primarily to the technical
community, but significantly many
others are of general consumer and
end-user interest: office productivity,
information management and
database suites that rival those from
commercial market leaders;
messaging client systems that outgun
any commercially sold; video and
music applications providing
functionality beyond any commercial
software; and some truly remarkable
computer games. 
These ideas are given away, not sold.
Worldwide communities of capable
software engineers and hobbyists –
better than money can buy –
converge, metaphorically at least, on
the Internet, to code and debug
useful software, which is then
released for the world to use and
improve. Corporate backing from
companies such as IBM, Intel, Nokia
and Sun Microsystems and support
services from companies like Red Hat
have provided credibility and
legitimacy to the Open Source
movement. 
As with markets, these developments
show emergent behavior, with no
strong, single central command, but
with global efficient out-comes
spontaneously arising from
uncoordinated individual actions and
economists have begun to study the
workings of this Open Source
mechanism.
We might at this stage understand
how, say, individual Open Source
programmers could be doing this
work only for its high profile
apprenticeship signalling function; they
are building reputations and lying in
wait for transition to high-paying, IP-
protected jobs. But we do not really
understand why such spontaneous,
emergent behaviour achieves the
successes and social optimally
outcomes that it has. Why are the
resulting products so often better and
more innovative than their commercial,
IP-protected counterparts? We can
only conjecture that, somehow, in
separating the dissemination rewards
from those accruing to innovation, the
Open Source mechanism attempts,
with no explicit guidance, to reinstate
endogenously one socially efficient
outcome. 
Perhaps it is a model that we can use
for other ideas than software. Ian
Ayres and Barry Nalebuff at Yale
University have attempted to initiate
such a model in their recent book,
“Why not? Using Everyday Ingenuity
to Solve Problems Big and Small” and
on its associated whynot.net website.
It may all seem a bit crazy, but not
obviously more so than the current
system we have for managing
intellectual property. 
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